How humans form categories and why they form the categories they do has long been the topic of considerable interest and debate in psychology (see Medin, 1989 , for a review). Categorization is an important topic to study and understand because the process itself is so fundamental to human existence and seems to contribute to human survival (Wisniewski & Medin, 1991) . Humans must frequently decide whether one species of animal is likely to be harmless or dangerous, whether one type of food is a fruit or a vegetable, whether an object is a chair or a table, and so on. This type of decision making helps humans make sense of and predictions about the environment (Wisniewski & Medin, 1991) .
Of particular interest recently are the category decision-making processes of human infants. Early research in the area assessed the ability of infants under 1 year of age to form perceptual categories (e .g., Cohen & Strauss, 1979) . More recent research has focused on the types of categories formed and the features used in categorizing. For example, research (e.g., Rakison & Butterworth, 1998) has examined the features used by infants to distinguish between animate and inanimate objects.
Other research (e.g., Quinn & Eimas, 1996a) has focused on the features used by infants to categorize similar-looking species of animals such as cats and dogs, and has concluded that 3-and 4-month-old infants use the face as the primary feature distinguishing cats from dogs.
Previous research on face processing had examined adults' (e.g., Bruce & Humphreys, 1994) and infants' responses (e.g., Mondloch et aI. , 1999; Morton & Johnson, 1991) to stimuli resembling human faces. However, as mentioned, Quinn and Eimas (1996a) have recently emphasized the role of the face in young infants' perceptual categorization of basic-level animal categories, whose members are frequently similar in size and shape. According to Quinn and Eimas (1996a) , facial information, internal features or external contour, provides infants with "a necessary and sufficient basis for distinguishing cats and dogs" (p. 200) .
In arriving at their conclusion about the importance of facial information, Quinn and Eimas (1996a) employed a visual preference procedure in their experiments. In this procedure, infants are shown visual stimuli during a familiarization phase. In a subsequent test phase, infants are presented with the familiar visual stimulus and a novel stimulus. Looking times to both novel and familiar stimuli are compared . Infants' preference for the novel stimulus is taken to indicate they have discriminated between the novel and familiar stimuli. Lack of preference is assumed to indicate, under appropriate experimental control , categorical similarity of the stimuli. Results of the Quinn and Eimas (1996a) series of experiments indicated that 3-and 4-month-old infants are capable of using the face/head region to differentiate dogs from cats.
In Quinn and Eimas' (1996a) initial experiment, infants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions in which they were familiarized with multiple exemplars of cats or parts of cats. In the whole animal condition, infants were fam iliarized with whole cats, for example, and then tested with a novel whole cat versus a whole dog. Infants in the remaining conditions-face only and body only-were familiarized with cat exemplars whose other body parts (e.g ., face , head, torso) were occluded by gray construction paper and tested with a novel cat exemplar versus a dog exemplar, each having its body parts occluded to resemble the occluded familiarization stimuli. The dependent measure was a novelty preference score based on test trials, calculated by dividing total looking time to the out-of-category exemplar by total looking time to the out-of-category exemplar plus total looking time to the novel withincategory exemplar. Infants in the whole animal and face only conditions treated the novel cat as familiar (i.e., as a member of the familiarization category) during test but those in the body only condition did not, an outcome suggesting the face region is important in infants' discrimination between cat and dog categories. In a subsequent experiment, Quinn and Eimas (1996a, Experiment 8) evaluated the importance of two parts of the face region: facial features and head outline. Stimuli included either (a) only the facial features, with head outline occluded or (b) only the head outline, with facial features occluded. The mean novelty preference of the facial features-occluded group was significantly above chance, demonstrating that the head outline is a salient attribute; however, significant recognition of the cat category was found in the facial featuresexposed condition only after additional subjects had been tested. From the results of these experiments, Quinn and Eimas (1996a) concluded that facial information provides infants with the diagnostic feature for determining category membership. According to the authors, the results of their experiments demonstrate that the information infants use in discriminating dogs from cats "does not consist of perceptual attributes from various regions of the bodies of the category exemplars (e.g., leg length, shape of body torso, appearance of tail). Rather, it seems to be information from a very specific region (namely, the head) that defines the category" (Quinn & Eimas, 1996a, p. 208) .
Although Quinn and Eimas (1996a) may be correct in concluding that infants use facial information to distinguish cats from dogs, at least under certain conditions, their conclusion that infants do not use body information away from the face/head region needs to be reconsidered. Research has shown that the classical view of categories as being unchanging mental representations comprised of necessary and sufficient features is problematical with respect to adults' categorization (see Medin, 1989 , for a review). One of the most serious problems with the classical view is that necessary and sufficient features cannot be found for all categories (Medin, 1989) . For example, it is extremely difficult to determine which feature must be present and what form the feature must take in order for an animal to be considered a bird. Because the classical view has dubious application with respect to adults' categorization, the classical view is also likely to be problematical with respect to infants' categorization. In other words, it is unlikely that in all categorization contexts, a single, necessary and sufficient attribute or multiple necessary and sufficient attributes could be found that unequivocally define cat and dog categories for 4-month-old infants. Rather, what seems more likely is that the body regions or attributes used by 4-month-olds in categorizing animals will depend on the circumstances in which categorization occurs.
One factor that may influence infants' use of various body attributes is the type of stimuli presented in test-whole animal stimuli versus truncated animal stimuli (body parts occluded with paper). Infants' formation of a cat category in the initial Quinn and Eimas (1996a) experiment may have been influenced by the truncated familiarization stimuli. Perhaps infants did not use body information in their body-only condition because, without a head, infants treated the upright forms in familiarization as objects with legs. If infants did treat the headless bodies as objects with legs, then infants would likely consider further analysis to be unnecessary and would show no greater interest for one headless body (cat or dog) over another in test. However, in the context of a whole, upright animal, as used in the present study, we hypothesized that infants would use torso information. That is, infants may initially use the head/face region to make gross categorizations of objects as animals (cf. Quinn & Eimas, 1996b) , but then look at other body regions, if available, for more fine-grained analyses. If other body regions are not available, as in the case of truncated stimuli, then infants will use the face alone for distinguishing between basic-level animal categories.
The goal of the present study was to examine infants' use of particular body regions when categorizing whole, rather than truncated, cat and dog pictures as stimuli. The present study was designed (a) to support the results of Eimas' (1996a, 1996b ) whole animal condition, in which infants formed a category of cats, and (b) to test the importance of the three body regions-internal facial features, head outline, and torso-relative to the whole animal condition. Once having established categorization in the whole animal condition, the importance of the three body regions relative to the whole animal condition could then be tested. Specifically, we hypothesized that infants would use body information when presented in test with whole animals, rather than with the headless animals with which they were presented in the Quinn and Eimas (1996a) study.
Method
The mean age of the 64 participating 4-month-old infants was 121. 91 days, SO = 3.69. The majority of participants were white and of a middleclass socioeconomic status. A familiarization/novelty preference procedure was used. Infants were familiarized to exemplars from one of two categories-a cat or a dog-followed by four test conditions for each animal category. Eight participants were assigned to each test condition in each animal category. All stimuli were whole animals. Each test compared (a) an exemplar from a novel category with (b) an exemplar from the familiarized category that was one of the following: an unmodified novel exemplar; face replaced by pig's face; head outline replaced by pig's head outline; torso replaced by pig's torso. A pig was chosen because of its relative similarity in size and shape to some breeds of cats and dogs. Participants viewed only one test pair. Which test pair was viewed depended upon the test condition to which infants were assigned (i.e., whole animal, face replaced, etc.). For example, if participants were assigned to the head-replaced condition, they would view a normal whole animal from the novel category paired with an animal from the familiarized category whose head was replaced with a pig's head. A novelty preference score was used as the dependent variable and calculated by dividing total looking time to the out-ofcategory exemplar by total looking time to the out-of-category exemplar plus total looking time to the novel within-category exemplar. A score greater than chance in the unmodified condition was expected if infants are able to form categories of cats and dogs. However, novelty preference scores above chance for the remaining conditions would not be expected if the body part replaced in a particular condition was perceived by infants as being uncharacteristic of the familiarization category. In the case of body parts being perceived as uncharacteristic of the category, infants should treat both test exemplars (within-category and out-of-category) as novel. Four observers, trained until interrater agreement reached 90% or better, recorded the data.
The stimuli, a subset of those used by Quinn and Eimas (1996a) , consisted of colored photographs of cats and dogs. Pictures of unmodified dogs came from Simon and Schuster's Guide to Dogs (Schuler, 1980) and pictures of unmodified cats came from Simon and Schuster's Guide to Cats (Siegal, 1983) . The cat and dog pictures were mounted on a light green paper background. The stimuli were enlarged or reduced to fit within a 12-cm square on a screen in front of the infants. Pictures of one cat and one dog, whose faces, heads, and torsos were all visible, were chosen for use as test stimuli. Twelve other pictures from each category were selected as familiarization stimuli. The 12 familiarization stimuli from each category were combined arbitrarily into six pairs which were presented in one of two familiarization orders on six 15-s trials; as a result, each participant viewed 12 different cats (or dogs) during familiarization.
Four between-subject test conditions were included, each involving two 15-s trials; the same two stimuli were presented to each subject on both trials, with the lateral position reversed on the second. One test stimulus in each condition was an unmodified whole animal from a novel category (cat, following familiarization to dogs, or dog, following familiarization to cats). In the whole animal condition, the other test stimulus was a novel exemplar from the familiarized category. For stimuli in the remaining three test conditions, one picture from the cat category and one from the dog category, of relatively similar coloration to the contrasting test stimulus, was modified so that a body part of a pig was substituted in place of the respective part of the dog and the cat: face, head, torso.
After the primary experiment, a discrimination/preference study was also conducted to ensure that the test stimuli in each condition of the test phase could be discriminated by infants. Sixteen infants were familiarized to the within-category animal , either an unmodified or modified (face, head, or torso replaced) cat; this animal was then paired with the out-ofcategory dog in test. Length and number of familiarization and test trials were the same as in the experiment itself.
Results
Two preliminary analyses were conducted. The first was conducted to determine whether infants habituated to the familiarization stimuli and, if so, whether the amount of response decrement was equivalent for both category types and all test conditions. Looking times during familiarization trials were analyzed in a category type (cat/dog) x test condition (whole animal, face, head, torso) x trial block (first three versus last three familiarization trials) analysis of variance. Only a significant decline in looking across trial blocks was found, F(1, 53) = 3.89, P = .05. The decline in looking time from the first trial block to the third trial block indicates that infants had habituated to the familiarization stimuli. Because no other effects were Significant, there was no evidence that response decrement differed among category types or test conditions. The second preliminary analysis compared the two familiarization orders; no order effect was found.
Before conducting analyses of the conditions in wh ich body parts were modified, establishing that infants were able to categorize normal cats and dogs was critical. The whole animal condition served as a baseline against which ali other conditions would be compared. To assess categorization of normal animals , a one-sample , two-tailed t test versus chance was performed on the whole animal condition of each category type. A novelty preference score higher than chance (.50) in the whole animal condition would demonstrate that infants were capable of forming categories of normal, intact cats and dogs. The t-test result for the whole animal condition of the cat category supported Quinn and Eimas' (1996a) findings (i.e ., that infants can form a category of cats that excludes dogs). The mean novelty preference score was .63, ~7) = 4.39, P = .003. In contrast to data for the whole animal condition of the cat category, the mean novelty preference score for the whole animal condition of the dog category was not significantly different from chance, .44, ~7) = 1.26, P = .249. A possible explanation for this categorization failure is presented in the Discussion section . Because infants failed to categorize dogs, additional analyses of the dog data were not conducted.
Further analyses were undertaken on the cat but not the dog data. As previously mentioned , a novelty preference score greater than chance was hypothesized for the whole animal condition. However, an additional hypothesis was that novelty preference scores above chance would not be obtained in any condition where a body part was modified if infants found the particular body part to be uncharacteristic of the familiarization category. A one-sample, two-tailed t test versus chance was conducted on the cat data from each of the remaining conditions. Novelty preference scores for the (a) face replaced, (b) head replaced , and (c) torso replaced conditions were: .51, .51 , and .44, respectively. None was significantly different from chance level: (a) ~7) = 0.13, P = .90; (b) ~7) = 0.43, P = .69; and (c) ~7) = 0.97, P = .36, respectively. Mean looking times to the cat condition test pictures are presented in Table 1 .
In addition, a one-way analysis of variance of novelty preference scores in the test conditions (four levels: whole animal , face-, head-, torso-replaced) was found to be significant, F(3 , 28) = 3.00, P =.04, eta (effect size) = .49 for the cat data. Comparisons of the test conditions comparison was between the unmodified, whole animal and the torso replacement conditions, demonstrating that the torso region was attended to during test and suggesting that the torso may have been the attribute most diagnostic of the cat category in our study.
As mentioned earlier, a discrimination/preference study was also conducted to ensure that the test stimuli could be discriminated. Because infants failed to categorize dogs in familiarization, a discrimination/ preference study was conducted on the cat test stimuli only. It was expected that infants would be able to discriminate between the test stimuli because Quinn , Eimas, and Rosenkrantz (1993) had already conducted discrimination tests on the unmodified animal stimuli and, in these discrimination tests , infants were able to distinguish between exemplars in each category. However, because one exemplar in each of the pairs of our test stimuli was a slightly modified version of the original stimulus, we decided to conduct a pilot study to confirm that infants could tell the test stimuli apart. Infants in each condition (whole animal , face , head , body) were consistently discriminating the test stimuli as expected; thus, the discrimination pilot study was terminated with 4 participants per condition. One-sample, two-tailed ttests versus chance (.50) were found to be reliably above chance fo r all four conditions. The following are the values of the mean novelty preferences for the (a) whole animal, (b) face , (c) head, and (d) torso conditions respectively: (a) .71, t(3) = 2.S5, P = .05; (b) .63, t(3) = 5.04, P = 01; (c) .66, t(3) = 2.70, P = .05; and (d) .74, t(3) = 3.31, P = .03. In addition, looking times to the unmodified and modified cat test stimuli during the first familiarization trial were analyzed in a oneway analysis of variance (four levels: whole animal, face-, head-, torsoreplaced) to determine whether one cat test stimulus was preferred over another. No effect was found, F(3 , 16) = .915, p = .46, suggesting a lack of a priori preference for one stimulus over another.
Discussion
Our study demonstrates that when whole animal stimuli are used in test, 4-month-old infants use the body region to distinguish between cats and dogs, two categories of animals that are similar in size and shape. The results of our study differ in two important ways from those of Quinn and Eimas (1996a) . First, we found no evidence that the face or head holds privileged status in young infants' perceptual differentiation of pictures of cats and dogs-two similar-looking, basic-level animal categories. If the head/face region "provides infants with a necessary and sufficient basis for distinguishing and categorizing cats and dogs" (Quinn & Eimas, 1996a, p. 200) , then a significant novelty preference should have been found in the torso condition, but not in the head or face conditions. However, our data do not provide support for privileged status of the head/face region in infants' categorization of similar-looking, basiclevel categories.
In certain contexts, infants probably use facial information to identify similar-looking animals, given their preference for facelike stimuli (see Maurer, 1985 , for a review). However, the data of the present study do not suggest that the face/head region consistently holds the greatest importance for 4-month-old infants when differentiating cats from dogs. As speculated earlier, the face region is not likely to be a necessary and sufficient feature under all conditions of categorization. Which body regions and attributes are used in categorization appears to depend, in part, on the type of exemplars employed in test. Use of whole rather than truncated animal stimuli is just one example of the influence that the types of contrasting exemplars presented in test may have on categorization decisions.
A second way in which our results differ from Quinn and Eimas' (1996a) results is that although they found no evidence of infants' use of the torso, we demonstrated that the torso is used by 4-month-olds during categorization. It might be argued that the modified animals in test distracted infants from preferring the novel dog after being familiarized with cats, but we believe any distraction was in relation to "catness," not to preference for a novel dog. That is, changes reflected in the modified cats, although subtle, were enough for infants to question whether or not the modified cat exemplars were reflective of the cat category. Possibly it could be suggested that our test stimuli have low ecological validity because they combine body parts from two animals, pig and cat, however, we disagree strongly with this suggestion. In the real world, animal species, including cats, have body parts that resemble those of other animals. For example, the Scottish and Highland Fold cats have been described in one cat reference manual (Richards, 1999) as having an owl-like appearance. In the same manual, a breed of cats known as the Sphynx is described as having ears resembling those of bats. Furthermore, in our visual examination of photographs of the hairless Sphynx, we observed that the hairless torso of this particular breed of cat is more similar to the torso of a pig (albeit an extremely thin pig) than to the torso of a short-or long-haired cat. In nature, and as the result of selective breeding, species of animals develop features that resemble those of other animal species. Thus, a major step in the categorization decision process of adults and infants is to decide which features should be used in determining category membership and how much variation in these features is permissible before the animal is no longer considered a part of the species under consideration.
Variation in features, specifically the high degree of variability among dog exemplars, probably played a role in infants' failure to categorize dogs in the familiarization phase of the present study. Quinn et al (1993) have demonstrated that category formation is related to the degree of variability of familiarization exemplars. In Experiment 4 of the Quinn et al. (1993) study, infants were familiarized to dog stimuli as in our study in a procedure similar to our own, and were then tested with a novel dog paired with a novel cat in test. Infants' novelty preference scores in test were not significantly different from chance, demonstrating that infants failed to form a category of dogs du ring familiarization. This categorization failure does not appear to be caused by an inability of infants to distinguish among the dogs, according to Quinn et al. (1993) . One potential explanation of infants' failure to categorize dogs offered by the authors is the high degree of variability among the dog stimulivariability that was greater among the dogs than the cats (Quinn et ai., 1993) . As the authors noted, the dog stimuli differed considerably in appearance. Quinn et al. (1993) found that when they selected a subset of the dog pictures, a subset less varied in appearance, categorization was achieved. Similar variability can be observed in the dog stimuli used in our study, which likely contributed to infants' failure to categorize the dogs in familiarization. Substantial differences in muzzle shape and size (small and wide versus long and narrow), hair length (short-haired such as bulldogs versus long-haired such as collies), and tail size (long versus stubby) can easily be observed among our dog stimuli. Further support for the belief that variability of exemplars affects categorization in general, and dog categorization in particular in this study, comes from research with adults. For example, Homa and Vosburgh (1976) found that when high variability exists among category exemplars, categorization does not take place as easily.
As previously mentioned, we believe that the type of stimuli presented in test-truncated versus whole animal-plays a substantial role in categorization. We also believe the particular contrasting exemplars presented in test may playa role. More specifically, the degree of differentiation between test exemplars may influence infants' use of body parts. As degree of differentiation between test exemplars increases, infants may show more reliance on the body/torso region and less reliance on the face/head region. If short-haired, short-tailed animals (e.g., dogs) were to be compared with long-haired, long-tailed animals (e.g., cats) of similar size and shape, body information might take on greater importance and perhaps provide a sufficient cue for distinguishing the two animal categories.
We offer additional suggestions about the importance of the specific contrasting exemplars selected for test. For instance, it is always possible that, in certain basic-level category comparisons, the head/face region may be more diagnostic of an animal category than the torso (e.g., elephant versus rhinoceros or long-haired , long-tailed dogs versus longhaired, long-tailed cats). However, the torso may also be more diagnostic than the face (e.g., camel versus giraffe). Likewise, coloration may be more diagnostic than head or torso (e.g., zebra versus horse). We speculate that no single attribute will be found to be necessary and sufficient under all conditions of infants' categorization of similar-looking, basic-level categories.
In addition to the influence that specific contrasting exemplars may have on categorization decisions, procedural factors may also influence the degree to which one body region is relied upon more than another. For example, length of trials has been found to influence infants' use of body information (Spencer, Quinn, Johnson, & Karmiloff-Smith, 1997) in categorization. We speculate that when given little time to process an object, the part of the object that most defines the category may be the part to which one first directs attention. If, as hypothesized previously, infants direct attention initially to the head region to determine whether or not an object is an animal, then the likelihood that infants would use body regions farther away from the head as diagnostic criteria of a category could be significantly decreased when short familiarization or test trials are employed. Experience may also playa role in the body regions used by participants as diagnostic of categories. Even 4-month-olds vary in the amount of contact they have with cats and dogs. Greater experience with a category may help to determine the relative importance of a body part (e.g., Johnson & Mervis, 1997) . Because categorization can be multiply influenced, it seems likely that categorization is context-dependent (Jones & Smith, 1993) even for 4-month-old infants, and that whatever body attribute or region is considered most diagnostic of an animal category depends on the circumstances in which categorization occurs. Two points should be considered in evaluating our results. First, the sample size was rather small (8 per condition in the primary experiment), potentially limiting the generalizability of our findings. Atlhough sample size is certainly a factor that should be considered in evaluating our results, Keppel (1991) has discussed the issue of small versus large sample size and has indicated that a small sample size is not necessarily problematical. Many researchers erroneously believe that the results of an experiment having a small sample size and an Fvalue significant at p < .05 are less important or significant than the results of an experiment having a larger sample size and an F significant at p < .05 (Rosenthal & Gaito, 1963) . However, Keppel (1991) pOints out that the study with the smaller sample size is likely to have the more substantial effect. The effect size (eta) for our one-way analysis of variance with four conditions (whole animal, face, head, body) was .49. This effect size demonstrates relatively strong support for our hypothesis that the torso/body region of cats is used by infants to distinguish cats from dogs under certain circumstances. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, Quinn and Eimas (1996a) did not find statistical significance at p < .05 in their face-exposed condition until 12 more participants were added to the condition, bringing the total number of participants in that condition to 24. The ne~d to add participants to achieve statistical significance suggests a smaller effect.
A second point to consider in evaluating our results is that, in Quinn and Eimas ' (1996a, 1996b) studies and ours, the terms "body" and "torso" include tail and limbs. Caution must be used in concluding that infants use torso information. Infants may actually use a specific part of the torso, for example, legs or tail , and not the torso itself, to differentiate between cats and dogs. Further studies should explore this issue.
